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DO THE EVOLUTION 
THE EFFECT OF KSR V. TELEFLEX ON BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
© 2008 Josh Harrison 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 In KSR v. Teleflex, the Supreme Court issued one of the most significant decisions 
dealt to intellectual property law in decades.1  The ruling effectively restructures the 
approach used by courts to determine whether a claimed invention is “non-obvious,” a 
historically ambiguous and ill-defined condition to obtaining a patent.2    
Biotechnology, or biotech, represents the forefront, both present and future, of 
modern medicine, agriculture, and energy.3  Its growth and evolution as a science and as 
a technology is essential to the enrichment and increased well-being of humanity as a 
whole.4  Because its funding stems primarily from private investors, biotechnology relies 
on consistent and dependable patent protection to sustain its progress and development.5   
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner, Making Sense of KSR and Other Recent Patent Cases, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 39, 39 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/ 
firstimpressions/vol106/wegner.pdf (“For long-range importance in patent law, KSR stands alone as the 
single most important Supreme Court patent decision on the bread and butter standard of ‘obviousness’ in 
the more than forty years since the 1966 Graham v. John Deere.”). 
2 Clara R. Cottrell, Note, The Supreme Court Brings a Sea Change with KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 595, 596 (2007) ("[A] patent attorney can spend five minutes describing the 
first three patent requirements, but the next five days defining and explaining the obviousness 
requirement.").  
3 See, e.g., BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, NEW BIOTECH TOOLS FOR A CLEANER 
ENVIRONMENT (June 2004) (discussing the evolution and potential for industrial biotechnology); 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, BIOTECHNOLOGY'S IMPACT ON DISEASES OF THE ELDERLY:  A 
WHITE PAPER (Sept. 2000) (discussing the current impact and promise of biotech medicines and foods in 
treating a range of age-related diseases). 
4 See, e.g., Deval Patrick & Therese Murray, The Promise of Biotech, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2007, 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/ 05/09/the_promise_of_biotech 
("You cannot be in the company of someone you love, powerless to help them, without appreciating the 
vital importance of stem cell research and other biomedical breakthroughs.  In many ways, the health of 
this industry and the health of our society are closely linked."); Florence Wambugu, Why Africa Needs 
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This note analyzes KSR v. Teleflex and the effects the Court's holding is likely to 
have on the biotech industry.  Part II begins the discussion with a brief overview of 
biotechnology's current and anticipated impact on human life.  Part III addresses the 
intimate relationship between biotech and patent law, exploring what is needed and why 
for the field to prosper.  Part IV outlines the general principles of the U.S. patent law 
system and succinctly delineates the progression of the “non-obvious” doctrine from the 
Supreme Court’s Graham framework to the Federal Circuit’s TSM test.  In so doing, 
particular emphasis is deservingly paid to the troubling issue of hindsight bias and to the 
pervasive consequences it poses to proper patent analysis.  Part V provides an 
introduction to the case, KSR v. Teleflex, and discusses its facts, its procedural history, 
and the Supreme Court’s ruling and rationale.  Part VI examines the decision and 
explores its likely impact on the future of biotechnology in America.  Part VII discusses 
procedural alternatives available to better address hindsight bias and concerns regarding 
patent over-issuance.  Part VIII concludes this note. 
II.  Biotech and Our Needs 
 The prevalence of biotechnology, or biotech, in modern society is so extensive 
that it is difficult to overstate.  Indeed, few fields offer the breadth of promise, potential 
for revolution, and current depth of accomplishments that biotech enjoys.  In strictly 
economic terms, the industry represents one of the most extensive and fastest growing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Agricultural Biotech, NATURE, July 1, 1999, at 15-16 (arguing that agricultural biotechnology is essential 
to eliminating hunger and poverty in third world countries). 
5 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350) [hereinafter Brief of Biotechnology 
Industry Organization]. 
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markets in the world.6  It accounts for over 20 billion dollars of research investment per 
year, and it provides employment to hundreds of thousands of people worldwide.7 
Nonetheless, the scientific value biotechnology offers far overshadows its 
contribution to the world or national economy.  It has literally revolutionized agriculture 
to the point that today over 252 million acres of the world’s crops are genetically 
modified or selectively bred.8  It has provided larger and improved global harvests 
through higher yield, nutritionally enhanced, and pest/herbicide resistant crops.9  It has 
likewise revolutionized modern medicine, pioneering breakthrough technologies such as 
bone marrow transplants, viral inoculations, and pharmaceuticals.10  It has paved the way 
for production of new therapies that treat an astounding and ever-growing range of 
medical disorders—including heart disease, AIDS, cancer, diabetes, anemia, and multiple 
sclerosis.11     
The field is still very much in its infancy, however, and the true brunt of its 
weight will surely be felt in the coming decades.  As the world population continues to 
grow and stretch its natural resources, more dependence on genetically modified, 
pesticide resistant, and nutritionally enhanced food sources will inevitably be invoked.12 
                                                 
6 See generally Joseph Cortright & Heike Mayer, Signs of Life:  The Growth of Biotechnology Centers in 
the U.S., BROOKINGS INST. CENTER ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY (2002) (examining the growth 
trends of the biotech industry in America); Press Release, Ernst & Young, Global Biotechnology Makes 
Historic Advances (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/International/Media_-
_Press_Release_-_Beyond_Borders_2007 (discussing the strong and sustained progress of the global 
biotech industry).  
7 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization, supra note 5, at 9. 
8 Clive James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2006, ISAAA BRIEFS NO. 35, 2006, at 
1. 
9 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization, supra note 5, at 8. 
10 U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Frequently Asked Questions About 
Biotechnology, http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/economic_issues/ biotechnology/biotech_faq.html (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2008). 
11 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization, supra note 5, at 8-9.  
12 See, e.g., Anatole Krattiger, Executive Director, ISAAA, Keynote Address at the ABIC '98 Conference:  
The Importance of Ag-Biotech to Global Prosperity (June 9-12, 1998), in ISAAA BRIEFS NO. 6, 1998.  
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Stem cell research could potentially lead to cures to an untold array of ailments, from 
cancer13 and diabetes14 to blindness15 and paralysis.16  In addition, developments in bio-
fuels, such as ethanol and bio-diesel, could ultimately free us from dependence on 
inefficient, costly, and environmentally harmful fossil fuels.17  
III.  Biotech and Intellectual Property Law 
While significant advances in biotechnology have already been realized, the road 
ahead remains arduous, and many milestones must be met before its full potential reaches 
fruition.  Research and development (R&D) in the field is exceptionally high-risk.18  
Millions of dollars and years of research may be exhausted on projects which have only a 
low probability of success starting out.  For example, the investment necessary to drive 
development of a single therapy can require over $800 million and 14 years of work.19  
According to the Biotechnology Industry Organization, “[f]or every successful 
pharmaceutical product, thousands of candidates are designed, screened, and rejected 
after large investments have been made.”20  Indeed, only a small minority of drug designs 
successful enough to advance to human clinical trials are approved by the FDA.21  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Krattiger notes that the next two generations’ food consumption will double that of the entire history of 
mankind, id. at 1, then emphasizes the necessary role of agricultural biotechnology in meeting this 
extraordinary demand, id. at 2-10.    
13 E.g., David Shaffer, Stem Cells Fight Cancer Tumors in U Research; By Boosting the Body's Natural 
Killer Cells, the Researchers Hope Eventually to Find New Ways to Treat Cancer Cells, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR TRIB., Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.stemcellnews.com/ articles/stem-cells-fight-cancer.htm. 
14 E.g., Press Release, Am. Diabetes Ass'n, Embryonic Stem Cell Research Offers Most Promise for 
Americans With Diabetes (July 17, 2006) (on file with author). 
15 E.g., Duncan Graham-Rowe, Fetal Tissue Restores Lost Sight, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 30, 2004, 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/15535.php. 
16 E.g., Roger Highfield, Umbilical Cord Cells 'Allow Paralysed Woman to Walk', DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 
11, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/ 2004 /11/30/wcells30.xml.  
17 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization, supra note 5, at 2 (“Research into plant-based fuels 
provides hope that the United States can lessen its dependence upon fossil fuels by making fuel 
alternatives, like ethanol and bio-diesel, more affordable.”). 
18 Id. at 9. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 10. 
21 Id. 
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chances, in fact, of a biopharmaceutical product achieving FDA approval are 
approximately one in 5,000.22  
Complicating this is the fact that although some of the research and development 
in biotech is publicly funded, the overwhelming majority draws from private sources.  
Indeed, as much as ninety-eight percent of R&D investment stems from the private 
sector.23  The high-risk nature of the industry therefore serves as a powerful deterrent to 
adequate funding, as the low likelihood of success is daunting to investors.24  
Nevertheless, when success is realized, the return can be staggering, providing the 
motivation necessary to keep investment in such endeavors alluring to private sponsors.25  
But for this to take effect, some guarantee must exist that, in the event such success is 
realized, the investors’ interests in the resulting technology will be protected.26   
The industry, therefore, relies heavily on stable, dependable protection from 
intellectual property laws to secure the fruits of its labor.27  Without such reliable 
protection, potential investors would be without reasonable assurance that even 
successful ventures would result in an adequate return on investment.  Tremendous 
resources could be devoted to the development of a technology that, once complete and 
marketable, is copied by a competitor and sold more cheaply because of that competitor’s 
absence of R&D overhead expenses.  The developing company, in debt as a result of the 
R&D costs and unable to compete with the prices of the infringing company, would go 
bankrupt.  This could destroy any incentive for the private sector to invest, and 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 9. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. (stating that investment “is predicated on an expected return . . . in the form of products or services 
that are protected by patents whose validity can be fairly determined”). 
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biotechnology as a whole, which hinges so closely on private funding, could suffer 
immensely.   
IV.  Overview of Patent Law and Non-Obviousness 
A.  Patent Requirements 
 Because of the intimate relationship between biotechnology and legal protection, 
a basic grasp of patent law principles is in order.  Essentially three requirements must be 
met for a discovery or invention to be considered patentable.  These requirements, 
codified in Title 35 of the United States Code, include that the claim be new, that it be 
useful, and that it be non-obvious.28  The most historically ambiguous of these three is 
the latter,29 which will be the focus of this note.  Broadly speaking, it insists that the 
claim seeking patent protection not be obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the 
art,”30 but the application of this standard has proven elusive over the years31—a fact 
perhaps unsurprising considering that neither the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit, nor the 
Supreme Court have defined the term “obvious.”32  In addition to being the most 
ambiguous of the requirements, or conceivably because of this, non-obviousness is also 
the most significant and heavily relied-upon in the realm of patent litigation.33  It is more 
commonly litigated than any other patent validity issue, and it is more likely than any 
other to result in the invalidation of a patent.34   
                                                
B.  Graham’s Clarification of Non-Obviousness 
 
28 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2006). 
29 Cottrell, supra note 2, at 596. 
30 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
31 JOHN KNIGHT, MOTIVATION FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT TEST 5 (2006), http://digital-law-
online.info/papers/jk/tsm.pdf. 
32 Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the  
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1399 (2006). 
33 Id. at 1398. 
34 Id. 
 7
In 1966, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the meaning of “non-obvious,” 
outlining the relevant factors for a court to consider when determining the obviousness of 
a claim.35  Those factors, referred to as the “Graham factors,” include:  (1) the scope and 
content of the prior art, (2) the level of ordinary skill in the prior art, (3) the differences 
between the claimed invention and the prior art, and (4) the objective evidence of non-
obviousness.36  For this fourth factor, the court delineated examples of factors that could 
be used to demonstrate such objective evidence of non-obviousness, including (a) 
commercial success, (b) long-felt, but unresolved needs, and (c) the failure of others.37 
C.  The TSM Test and Hindsight Bias 
When the Court decided Graham, it recognized its approach would need further 
development at the lower court level, and, for over two decades, the Federal Circuit has 
developed such an approach.38  Popularly known as the TSM test, it requires as part of 
the analysis that to hold invalid a combination patent—an invention that takes known and 
existing pieces of the prior art but combines them in a novel way—there must be some 
“teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine the pieces of art to arrive at the claimed 
invention as a whole.”39  This teaching-suggestion-motivation, or TSM, analysis 
“informs the Graham analysis.”40  According to the Federal Circuit, the teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation necessary need not be explicitly listed in the references, but 
may be “implicit from the prior art as a whole.”41  
                                                 
35 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
36 Id. at 17. 
37 Id. at 17-18.   
38 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization, supra note 5, at 15. 
39 Id. at 16. 
40 In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
41 Id. (quoting In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
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 The development and increased reliance on the TSM test over the years emerged 
largely to better account for what is known as hindsight bias—the tendency to regard past 
events as more predictable than they actually were before they occurred.42  To put the 
principle in terms more readily applicable to patent law, it is the inclination to consider 
obvious, in hindsight, past combinations of then-existing parts in the creation of a new 
invention.43  If this propensity is not adequately addressed, truly innovative and non-
obvious advances may nonetheless be denied patent protection on grounds of 
obviousness.44  Such susceptibility threatens not only the integrity of the intellectual 
property framework, it threatens—as discussed above—the progress of applied sciences, 
like biotechnology, which require consistent, dependable, and objective legal protection 
in order to facilitate adequate funding and encourage the free-flow of information.   
The situation is complicated by the fact that hindsight bias is actually afforded 
two opportunities to influence the obviousness analysis.  The first, more traditionally 
recognized of the two, involves the determination of whether or not the claimed invention 
was obvious at its conception.45  Such a determination would ideally be free of the 
consideration that the invention was actually, in fact, successfully produced.46  This 
requires, in essence, the decision-maker to mentally time-travel back to a period before 
the invention was known.47  But people are not cognitively capable of ignoring what they 
know, so this is—in a pure sense—simply unachievable.48  Studies exposing this inability 
illustrate the practical impossibility of effectively making a proper retrospective 
                                                 
42 KNIGHT, supra note 31, at 3. 
43 Id. at 12. 
44 Id. at 13. 
45 Mandel, supra note 32, at 1405. 
46 Id. at 1393. 
47 Id. at 1399. 
48 Id. at 1400. 
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evaluation of obviousness,49 and the predisposition has unfortunately proven strikingly 
resistant to various techniques aimed at curtailing its effect.50  Even when explicitly 
warned about hindsight bias or instructed to assume the position of a person unaware of 
the known outcome, individuals nonetheless unconsciously allow their awareness of that 
outcome to permeate their evaluation and bias their conclusions as to the obviousness or 
predictability of the outcome in the first instance.51  
 The second opportunity for hindsight bias to impact the obviousness analysis is in 
the determination of the past level of ordinary skill in the art.52  Because the obviousness 
of an invention is considered in light of what a “person having ordinary skill in the art” 
(PHOSITA) would have known at the time,53 it is again the obligation of the decision-
maker to retreat in time to back before the invention was produced and evaluate the skill 
level present in the trade.  But because the skill level of a given trade necessarily expands 
with time, hindsight bias can lead the decision-maker to regard the historic skill level of 
the trade as more sophisticated than it was in truth.54  As a result, genuinely non-obvious 
inventions and insights hailing from that era’s misattributed skill level may improperly be 
considered obvious.55  
The threat is most pronounced in relation to the so-called combination patents—
those inventions that combine existing pieces of the prior art in novel ways.  Because all 
the elements of such an invention are previously known, virtually every combination may 
seem obvious after the fact.  This dilemma is especially poignant today considering that 
                                                 
49 Id. at 1393. 
50 Id. at 1403. 
51 Id. at 1393.   
52 Id. at 1405. 
53 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
54 Mandel, supra note 32, at 1405. 
55 Id. 
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most of, if not all, claimed inventions “almost of necessity [are] combinations of what, in 
some sense, is already known.”56  
 The courts have long since acknowledged the potentially devastating impact 
unchecked hindsight bias could have on the accurate evaluation of patents.  The Supreme 
Court, in fact, identified the issue as early as 1881 in Loom v. Higgins.57  But because 
hindsight bias appears to be an inevitable condition of the human cognitive process,58 and 
because the nature of patent evaluation necessarily involves some level of subjective 
assessment, the only practical goal is to minimize, rather than entirely eradicate, the 
impact of the bias.  An analytical framework with built-in objective criteria, as opposed 
to one more heavily weighted with subjective measures, would logically provide the best 
safeguard.  By requiring either an explicit or an implicit teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation to combine elements of the prior art in order to invalidate a patent, therefore, 
the Federal Circuit’s TSM test, although not perfect, provided a layer of insulation to the 
Graham framework to guard against hindsight bias.   
V.  KSR:  The Facts, History, and Arguments 
A.  The Background 
The TSM test has encountered its share of opposition over the years—both from 
those who feel it is too rigid,59 as well as from those who feel it is too lax.60  
                                                 
56 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007). 
57 Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881) (“Now that [the invention] has succeeded, it may seem 
very plain to any one that he could have done it as well.  This is often the case with inventions of the 
greatest merit.”). 
58 Mandel, supra note 32, at 1400. 
59 See Cottrell, supra note 2, at 604 (discussing the “inherent problems” of the TSM test and stating that the 
broadest concern is its inflexibility); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
21, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (arguing how the test has led to 
problems of patent over-issuance).  
60 See Mandel, supra note 32, at 1414-18 (demonstrating how hindsight bias affects the decisions of juries, 
judges, and patent examiners). 
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Nevertheless, for over two decades, the Federal Circuit’s approach served in tandem with 
the Graham analysis to form the standard of determining the obviousness or non-
obviousness of a patent claim.61   
In late spring of 2007, however, the Supreme Court struck down a Federal Circuit 
decision in KSR v. Teleflex, criticizing the appellate court’s application of the TSM test as 
too stringent and inflexible.62  Although stopping shy of explicitly discarding the test 
altogether, the Court made it abundantly clear it was no longer to be afforded anywhere 
near the degree of consequence it had accumulated over the years.63 
 KSR involved two competing manufacturers of automobile components.  A brief 
mechanical background is necessary to fully appreciate the dispute, as the case hinged 
upon what was reasonably obvious, based on the prior art, to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art.   
 The 1990’s brought many innovations to the world of automobile manufacturing, 
one of the most pronounced and far-reaching being an increased dependence on 
electronic signals to perform the duties traditionally carried out by physical mechanics.64  
From locks and windows to combustion and diagnostics, virtually every facet of the 
automobile transformed from mechanically-driven to computer-driven.  Gas and brake 
pedals were no exception, and it became increasingly popular to replace the mechanical 
pivot on the pedals with electronic sensors that detected and communicated the pedals' 
position to the throttle.   
                                                 
61 KNIGHT, supra note 31, at 12. 
62 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-43 (2007).  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1735. 
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A situation that commonly arises involves drivers wishing to alter the position of 
the pedal in the footwell to account for differences in his or her height.  For older 
automobile models, adjustable pedals were invented, patented, and made available.65  
The Asano patent encompasses one such invention.  It discloses an adjustable pedal wit
a fixed pivot point, which allows the pedal’s position to be adjusted in the footwell 




   
                                                
66  The Redding pate
also depicts an adjustable pedal, but with a different operating mechanism by which both
the pedal and the pivot point are altered.67
As technology in the auto industry evolved towards electronic signaling, a number 
of patents emerged to amend the mechanical pedal constructs to the new computer-based 
model.68  Designers began placing electronic sensors on the adjustable pedal kits, but 
questions surfaced regarding the sensors’ ideal location on the assemblies to best account 
for wire-chafing and similar common limitations.69  The Rixon patent, for instance, 
involves an adjustable pedal with an electronic sensor located in the pedal footpad, but it 
is prone to wire-chafing.70  The Smith patent—issued five years prior to Rixon—
recommends attaching the sensor to a fixed part of the assembly, rather than on the 
footpad, in order to sidestep this problem.71  Though sensors were originally affixed to 
the pedal assembly, self-modulated ones were eventually developed.  These sensors could 
 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 1735-36. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 1736.  
71 Id. at 1735-36. 
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be sold individually and joined with any mechanical pedal, making it compatible with a 
computer-driven throttle.72     
B.  The Parties 
In 2000, General Motors Corporation hired KSR, an auto part manufacturer and 
supplier, to supply adjustable pedal systems for its line of light trucks.73 The trucks had 
engines with computer-controlled throttles.74  KSR had previously designed and obtained 
a patent for an adjustable mechanical pedal, but the device was not equipped to function 
with a computer-controlled throttle.75  So KSR took its design and added a modular 
sensor.76 
 Teleflex brought a patent infringement suit against KSR, claiming that this 
sensor-equipped KSR pedal violated Teleflex’s so-called Engelgau patent, which 
essentially described how to attach such a sensor to such a pedal.77  More specifically, the 
Engelgau patent disclosed a simpler, less expensive pedal that combined the principles 
taught by the Smith, Redding, and Asano patents.78  KSR mounted a defense alleging 
Teleflex’s patent invalid as obvious.79  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of KSR, applying the framework from Graham and the TSM test to determine that 
the claim in question was indeed obvious in light of the prior art.80   
                                                 
72 Id. at 1736. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 1737. 
78 Id. at 1738. 
79 Id. at 1737. 
80 Id. 
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 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, relying primarily on the 
TSM test and holding that the lower court failed to apply the test stringently enough.81  
The trial court failed, according the Court of Appeals, to make findings “as to the specific 
understanding or principle” that would have motivated a PHOSITA with no knowledge 
of the invention to attach to the Asano assembly an electronic sensor.82  The Asano pedal 
was designed to address one dilemma, whereas the Engelgau claim sought to address 
another—how to make “a simpler, smaller, cheaper adjustable electronic pedal.”83  
Similarly, the Federal Circuit interpreted the other relevant prior art disclosures as not 
offering to a PHOSITA the requisite teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine a 
sensor on the type of pedal depicted in Asano.84  Rixon did not offer any helpful 
instruction to Engelgau, according to the Court of Appeals, and Smith did not necessarily 
provide motivation to attach the sensor as Engelgau did.85  The nature of the problem 
Engelgau sought to remedy, in other words, would not in-and-of itself motivate or 
instruct an inventor to look to these specific instances of the prior art in achieving a 
solution.86  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Engelgau patent combined various 
elements of existing designs in an inventive way that was non-obvious to a skilled artisan 
at the time.  Because there was no explicit or implicit references in the prior art teaching, 
suggesting, or motivating a PHOSITA to combine these elements in this manner, the 
Court of Appeals decided the district court had too leniently applied the TSM test.87    
C.  The Decision 
                                                 
81 Id. at 1738. 
82 Id. (quoting lower court). 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 1738-39. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 1739. 
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 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in November 2006, heard oral 
arguments.88  The case generated substantial attention from various spheres, as many 
immediately recognized the potential consequences of the pending decision.89  Both sides 
were well represented.  Groups such as the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the American Bar Association, and the 
Business Software Alliance submitted Amicus Briefs.90  
 On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision, 
reversing the Federal Circuit and affirming the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in KSR’s favor.91  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s "rigid approach" embodied in the TSM test, “in part because it depends on 
scientific literature and other forms of evidence that may not keep pace with fast-
developing technologies.”92  The Court listed several specific errors and what it called 
“fundamental misunderstandings” in how the Federal Circuit analyzed the case.93  In 
considering the Teleflex patent, for instance, the Court accused the appeals court of 
considering what a “pedal designer writing on a blank slate” would have done to solve 
                                                 
88 Id. at 1727. 
89 See, e.g., S. Jafar Ali, You Suggest What?  How KSR Returned the Bite To Nonobviousness, 16 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 247, 271 (2006) (“[KSR] presents an invaluable opportunity for the Court to clarify and restore 
uniformity to the law of nonobviousness.”); Cottrell, supra note 2, at 626 (noting that “both sides of KSR 
believe the outcome of the case will cause a sea of change in the patent system”). 
90 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization, supra note 5; Brief of American Intellectual Property Law 
Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) 
(No. 04-1350); Brief of American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350); Brief of Business Software Alliance as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350). 
91 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1727. 
92 Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Adopts New Standard on Patent Litigation, LEGAL TIMES, May 1, 2007, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1177936770561. 
93 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739-44. 
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the problem Engelgau addressed.94  This was an error, the Court suggested, as the slate 
was not blank.95  Teleflex, instead, was simply upgrading the existing technology.96    
 The problem, according to the Court, was not the TSM test itself, or even the 
Federal Circuit’s overall approach.  Rather, it was the rigid manner in which the Federal 
Circuit applied the test.97  Kennedy said the Federal Circuit’s strict application of the 
TSM test led to a “constricted analysis” that gave too much deference to the inventor’s 
motivation and too little deference to whether there “existed at the time of the invention a 
known problem for which there was an obvious solution.”98  According to the Court, the 
Engelgau patent fell under this banner.99   
The Court warned that progress would be hindered and prior inventions could lose 
their value if patent protection was extended to developments that would occur in the 
“ordinary course without real innovation.”100  Instances of such “ordinary innovation” are 
not, and should not be, afforded exclusive rights under intellectual property laws.101  
“Were it otherwise,” the Court cautioned, “patents might stifle, rather than promote, the 
progress of useful arts.”102  The Court’s unanimous ruling was cordial, however, referring 
                                                 
94 Id. at 1744. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1745.  The Court suggested the Teleflex patent merely represented an upgrade of the Asano patent, 
stating that “[i]f Rixon’s base pedal was not too flawed to upgrade, then Dr. Radcliffe’s declaration does 
not show Asano was either.”  Id. 
97 Id. at 1741 (“There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the 
Graham analysis.  But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the 
obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.”). 
98 Id. at 1742. 
99 Id. at 1746. 
100 Id. at 1741.  
101 Id. at 1746. 
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to the TSM test as a “helpful insight” and noting that it should still play a role in a 
broader test for obviousness.103   
VI.  What KSR Means for Biotechnology 
 Without question, the KSR decision is a major development in patent law.  Indeed, 
the Washington Post hailed the decision as the Court’s furthest reaching ruling in the 
patent field for decades104—a strong sentiment echoed by many others in the days and 
months following the verdict.105   
The “non-obvious” requirement, as previously mentioned, is easily both the most 
frequently litigated of issues relating to patent validity,106 as well as the most historically 
ambiguous and ill-defined.107  Rather than bestowing to the patent world some much-
needed direction or sense of clarity in the matter, the Court’s decision in KSR does little 
but add to the already superfluous, muddled uncertainty that the test it chastised sought to 
improve.  It essentially takes the thrust out of the TSM approach, reducing it to a shell of 
a test and giving it about as much muscle and authority as a non-binding regulation.  
Worse, however, is that the Court, in criticizing but not discarding the Federal Circuit’s 
approach, offers in its place no substitute—no workable proxy or cohesive guiding light 
                                                 
103 Id. at 1741.  The Court remarked that, in first establishing the TSM test, “the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals captured a helpful insight.”  Id.  The Court later added, “[h]elpful insights, however, need 
not become rigid and mandatory formulas.”  Id.    
104 Robert Barnes & Alan Sipress, Rulings Weaken Patents’ Power, High Court Decides  
on Two Key Cases, WASH. POST, May 1, 2007, at D01. 
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106 Mandel, supra note 32, at 1398. 
107 Cottrell, supra note 2, at 596. 
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to inform the Graham analysis.  Supporters of the ruling will no doubt contend that the 
Court voiced a problem, not with the TSM test itself, but rather with the Federal Circuit’s 
rigid application of it.  But this argument misses the point altogether—ambiguity, not 
rigidity, is the dilemma with respect to non-obviousness.  The two approaches competing 
in KSR were flexibility and predictability, and the Court sided with flexibility.108  
Flexibility means subjectivity, which means more ambiguity, which means science and 
law will recede rather than progress in this regard.109   
 As a result, KSR’s outcome is likely to be broadly felt.110  The impact will surface 
in two major ways:  first, new patents will be more difficult to obtain; second, those that 
are obtained, as well as those already in existence, will be more prone to invalidation on 
grounds of obviousness.  These added burdens, discussed below, will threaten the 
reputation and value of patent laws in the United States, make adequate funding for 
research and development substantially more difficult to procure, and, thus, render a 
crippling blow to the pace and welfare of scientific progress—the very advancements 
U.S. patent laws were intended to protect.111 
A.  Effect on Future Patent Claims 
The TSM test developed to better account for hindsight bias, which, it was 
recognized, could label genuinely non-obvious inventions as obvious, thus unjustly 
barring them from patent protection.  The quandary posed by this to fields such as 
                                                 
108 Barnes & Sipress, supra note 104. 
109 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization, supra note 5, at 1-3 (emphasizing the reliance of science 
on objective standards in patent laws and asserting that “[i]f those standards were to become less objective . 
. . increased uncertainty about the availability of patent rights would deter investment within the . . . 
industry”). 
110 See, e.g., Barnes & Sipress, supra note 104, at D01 (stating the KSR decision could “change the rules of 
the game from the way they’ve been for the last 20 years or so”). 
111 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting to Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries"). 
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biotechnology is troubling and urgent, as it effectively undermines the purpose of the 
patent system by rendering its outcomes erratic and unpredictable.  The TSM test, 
however, by requiring that a reference in the prior art provide some teaching, suggestion, 
or motivation to combine elements known in the art in order to establish the obviousness 
of a combination invention, afforded the patent system improved, though still imperfect, 
shelter from hindsight bias.  KSR threatens this fabric, as it takes the wind out of the TSM 
sail and, in essence, opens the floodgates to subjectivity and hindsight with little but a 
fleeting warning that the courts be weary of their risk.112   
As a result, judges and patent examiners will have much more discretion, and 
much less accountability, when weighing the obviousness of a patent claim.  Psychology 
demonstrates the human inability to evade hindsight bias, even when explicitly reminded 
of its presence,113 so without a built-in mechanism to neutralize its influence, it will 
undoubtedly play a larger roll in the patenting process.  Many truly non-obvious claims 
will therefore be denied protection on grounds of hindsight-based “non-obviousness”—a 
situation the TSM test was far better equipped to forestall.  Ultimately this means exactly 
what is appears to mean:  it will be much harder to obtain patent protection, especially for 
combination patents. 
Although a number of biotechnology patent experts initially predicted a gloomy 
forecast for KSR's impact on biotech patents, others seemed unconcerned, as discoveries 
and inventions in the biotech domain tend to be extensively more complex then adding a 
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sensor to a car pedal.114  This complexity, it was thought, would effectively shield much 
of the industry from the KSR decision.115  But just a month after the Court announced its 
decision, the USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, relying on KSR, 
delivered a blow to this theory.116  Reviewing a patent examiner's rejection of claims 
involving nucleic acid molecules, the Board upheld the rejection as obvious because the 
claims combined three references (a patent, a textbook, and a scientific report) and 
because, the Board decided, a PHOSITA would have (a) realized the use of isolating 
NAIL cDNA and (b) been motivated to utilize traditional techniques to do so.117  The 
opinion seemingly discards the Federal Circuit's 1995 decision, In re Deuel, in which the 
appeals court held, "'Obvious to try' has long been held not to constitute obviousness."118  
Indeed, the Board pronounced, "Under KSR, it's now apparent 'obvious to try' may be an 
appropriate test in more situations than we previously contemplated."119  
Practically, for biotechnology, all this translates into far greater risk for investors.  
Before KSR, the gamble involved in funding research and development was daunting 
enough—a lot of money was necessary and the odds of the science working out were 
poor.  Now, after KSR, even if the science does work out and a successful, inventive 
product is developed, there is no longer assurance from the patent law that the product 
will be protected from pilfering competitors.  Investors will be discouraged from 
investing in biotechnology, and without adequate funds, important advances in the field 
will be either delayed altogether or achieved overseas.   
                                                 
114 Phill Jones, Cultivar Cultivates Disaster for Soybean Patent While Supremes Throttle  
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117 Id. at 10. 
118 Id. at 8-9. 
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The detriment of this will fall disproportionately on smaller biotech firms, since 
these entities—as well as universities conducting research—do not possess the 
tremendous resources necessary to actually manufacture the biotech products, run 
sufficient clinical trials on them, and sell them on the market.120  Only large biotech 
companies, then, will have the wherewithal to develop and produce such products.121 
Even when financing issues are not present, however, KSR may still have widely 
felt implications.  Because of the diminished predictability of the patenting analysis, 
companies that can afford to do so may forego the crapshoot altogether.  It is important to 
keep in mind that patent laws benefit not more than merely the inventors themselves—
they also benefit the scientific community as a whole by promoting the disclosure of 
discoveries and advances that may otherwise be kept secret.  With flexible, but 
unpredictable patenting procedures in place, many companies may grow introverted, 
keeping the recipes to their achievements under wraps.  Science will suffer as a result, as 
will the public interest. 
B.  Effect on Present Patents 
The Court’s decision in KSR, adopting a more flexible standard, will likely 
weaken patent protection on another front as well.  Not only will it be more difficult to 
get a patent issued, it will be more difficult to withstand obviousness challenges to 
existing patents.  The new standard endorsed by the Court is likely to “weaken the 
protection given to patent holders, making it . . . easier to challenge existing” patents on 
grounds of obviousness.122  Said differently, because the Court's decision applies to 
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patent validity challenges concerning patents issued both before and after KSR, it may 
“subject existing patent-holders to fresh litigation over obviousness.”123 
Specifically, it raises the standard “for obtaining patents on new products that 
combine elements of pre-existing inventions.”124  As most inventions are merely new 
combinations of previously known parts, the approach endorsed by the Court in KSR for 
determining what combinations are too obvious for patent protection will have extensive 
application.125  The result will be to make patents not only harder to obtain, but to defend.  
As one IP attorney in Pittsburgh explained, “Nearly every patent that contains a 
combination of prior ideas is at risk because the court has dramatically broadened the 
standard of obviousness.”126  Michael Kreeger, one of the lawyers who prepared the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization's amicus brief in support of Teleflex, resonated this 
concern and warned that thousands of cases may emerge requesting the Patent Office to 
re-examine already-issued patents.  “It doesn’t take a lot of resources to ask for a re-
examination,” he mentioned.127  He also pointed out that judges will now have more 
freedom to dismiss patent infringement suits without requiring a jury trial, and that patent 
examiners, who generally grant patent applications unless they find prior references to 
the same invention, will now have more leeway to deny claims.128   
Monsanto Company, a multinational leader of agricultural biotechnology, 
encountered this reality only three months after KSR was handed down.129  Upon petition 
by a nonprofit legal services group to reexamine four Monsanto patents involving 
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genetically modified crops, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected the 
patents on the grounds that the claims were not "non-obvious."130  Monsanto believes no 
legitimate grounds for rejecting the patents exist, and it has already filed responses to 
three of the four rejections.131  This mega-company, thanks to its size and control of the 
market share, can afford to fight back—a luxury not likely available to more modestly 
situated businesses which simply lack the resources required to win such a war of 
attrition.   
Not all interested parties share these concerns, however.  The Business Software 
Alliance, for instance, applauded the Court's decision.  A spokesperson for the 
organization commented, “The ruling in the KSR case will improve patent quality by 
enabling examiners and the courts to deny patents to questionable applications.”132  But 
opponents disagree with this line of reasoning and fear the decision puts too much power 
in the subjective hands of individuals prone to hindsight bias.  “This leaves patent 
litigation in a state of total disarray,” according to Legal Times.  “Judges are now 
permitted to use their own common sense rather than objective evidence or testimony.”133
 The vast freedom now afforded patent examiners to reject applications on 
obviousness grounds could raise not only the costs involved in litigation, but the costs of 
obtaining a patent in the first place as well.134  According to John R. Thomas, a 
Georgetown University law professor, "The bottom-line effect is that interested parties 
have a greater ability to challenge patents and a greater possibility of prevailing."135  This 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Mauro, supra note 92. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Barnes & Sipress, supra note 104. 
 24
makes existing patents, issued according to a standard the Supreme Court has now 
rejected, much more vulnerable to legal challenges.136  In particular, Thomas predicts that 
generic drug makers will increase their number of lawsuits against pharmaceutical 
companies.137 
VII.  Limitations and Resolutions 
 Apart from those criticizing the holding in KSR and those praising it, some 
commentators appear to more-or-less sympathize with the Court.  KSR represented an 
opportunity to redress the issue of patent over-issuance, as well as that of hindsight bias, 
and the Court arguably failed in both regards.138  Courts in general, however, may simply 
not be equipped to resolve such issues.139  Reform, instead, may need to emerge from the 
ranks of Congress or the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).140  Congress, as opposed to 
the courts, has the necessary resources with which to balance these two troubles—
hindsight and over-issuance—and the PTO has the expertise.141   
 A number of suggestions exist as to how such reform could take shape.  One 
proposal calls for the PTO to conduct post-grant reviews, with reviewers selected based 
upon their personal expertise in the particular matter at issue.142  Under this system, the 
obviousness determination of a claimed invention would be made separately by an 
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experienced patent examiner and a panel of experts.143  Such a structure could 
simultaneously confront over-issuance and hindsight bias.144   
Another proposed format involves allowing third parties to submit their own 
evidence of prior art to the patent examiner.145  Because patent applicants are not 
currently required by law to conduct and submit prior art searches, permitting interested 
third parties to do so would better insure the patent examiner has all the pertinent data on 
hand.146  This adversarial process would add a coat of protection to address over-issuance 
concerns.147  
A third option is to employ a bifurcated system of two patent examiners.148  One 
examiner would conduct the traditional patent analysis, but without making an 
obviousness determination.149  The second examiner, informed only of the problem to be 
solved and the level of ordinary skill in the art—but not informed of the actual claimed 
invention—would perform the obviousness analysis.150  By separating out the 
obviousness finding from the rest of the patent examination procedure, hindsight bias 
may finally be adequately checked.151  Combining this system with an adversarial 
process similar to the one discussed above would allow for a substantially enhanced 
defense mechanism against both hindsight bias and over-issuance.152  
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These suggestions, of course, do not represent an exhaustive survey of possible 
remedies to the obviousness impasse.  What they do demonstrate, however, is that 
conceivable solutions do exist and can be posited if ingenuity and innovation are put to 
proper use in the tackling of this persistent and plaguing problem.  But whatever 
resolutions may arise in the future at the PTO level, their formal origins have seemingly 
yet to take root, as the PTO's post-KSR examination guidelines for determining 
obviousness, published in October 2007, essentially go no further than codifying the 
holding of that case.153   
VIII.  Conclusion 
 Though the full impact of KSR on the biotechnology industry is impossible to 
predict, some things are certain.  The flexible, subjective approach endorsed by the Court 
in KSR will make patents harder to get and harder to defend.  This not only drives up the 
already-staggering legal costs associated with intellectual property protection, it 
essentially makes the likelihood of winning effective patent protection even more of a 
crapshoot.  Investors funding technology R&D endeavors will necessarily be assuming a 
much higher risk in funding already high-risk/high-cost projects.  Because biotechnology 
relies so heavily on private funding, and because such private funding is conditioned on 
the probability of profit, KSR could have profound, negative implications for the ability 
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of biotech to secure adequate financing for its ambitions.  Inventions require research and 
research requires money . . . money requires the opportunity to earn a profit.  KSR 
severely diminishes this opportunity, and the trickle-down effect is immediately evident.   
Not only will it be more difficult to get a patent issued, but once one is issued, it 
carries much less strength and security—as a challenge on grounds of obviousness will 
have a greater likelihood of success.  In addition, existing patents may be re-opened for 
re-examination, leaving basically every issued patent in danger.  Litigation costs 
associated with defending these patents could put a stranglehold on the corporations, as a 
larger percentage of what funds the companies do possess will necessarily be devoted to 
legal expenses rather than R&D.   
 Even setting financial issues aside, KSR could have a stifling effect on the biotech 
community, as companies will have less incentive to disclose their discoveries and 
inventions.  Smaller companies will be hit disproportionately hard, as only their larger, 
multinational counterparts will control the resources sufficient to develop products, 
procure pricy—but priceless—patent protection, and afford the staggering costs involved 
in the increasingly likely event of litigation.   
 The patent law system was put in place to protect inventors’ interests in effort to 
encourage the disclosure of technological advances that may otherwise be kept secret.  
This provides a substantial benefit to the scientific community, as well as society at large, 
by increasing the free-flow of information and spurring further progress.  In order for the 
patent system to work effectively, however, it must provide reliable, dependable 
protection to new, non-obvious, and useful inventions.  KSR v. Teleflex calls this into 
question by favoring flexibility over predictability and giving judges and patent 
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examiners excessive discretion to assess patent claims.  Subjectivity and hindsight bias 
result in a watered-down and unreliable system that undermines the purpose and potential 
patent protection was intended to possess.  Reform may be needed, but KSR suggests it is 
not likely to come from the Supreme Court.  Ingenuity, wisdom, and resourcefulness, 
particularly at the congressional and PTO levels, may be the best hope.  Perhaps KSR's 
legacy, then, will not be in the changes it brought directly, but rather in the changes it 
stimulated others to make in response. 
 
